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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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E.H.R.

THE KIDNAPPING AND DEATH OF AMBASSADOR ADOLPH DUBS

FEBRUARY 14, 1979

KABUL, AFGHANISTAN

SUMMARY OF REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

Prepared by the
Special Assignments Staff
Office of Security
Department of State

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CSG/AS

REVIEWED BY Ad Mass DATE 4/11/88

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SUMMARY

On February 14, 1979, the U.S. Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), Adolph Duba, was abducted while traveling alone in his chauffeur driven automobile enroute from his residence to the U.S. Embassy, Kabul.

Shortly after his departure from the residence, the Ambassador's automobile was motioned to stop by an individual dressed as a local policeman. The individual asked to search the automobile stating he was under orders of the government. After a brief conversation, the Ambassador agreed to an examination of the vehicle. During the search, the policeman produced a small handgun, ordered the chauffeur not to move, and immediately three individuals dressed in civilian clothes appeared on the scene. One of the three was also observed to be armed with a small handgun. The four individuals forced their way into the Ambassador's vehicle, and the chauffeur was compelled at gunpoint to drive the short distance to the Kabul Hotel.

Upon arriving at the Kabul Hotel the Ambassador was taken by his captors into the hotel and held hostage on the second floor, inside Room 117. The chauffeur was instructed by one of the terrorists to inform the U.S. Embassy of the abduction.

Upon being advised that the Ambassador had been abducted, U.S. Embassy officials promptly notified appropriate Afghan authorities. In the meantime, three Embassy officers and one Foreign Service National Employee departed for the Kabul Hotel arriving minutes later. During the course of the next several hours, a total of nine U.S. Embassy officers would be present at the hotel.

Immediately after the arrival of the first U.S. Embassy officers, a small group of Afghan police officials arrived to be eventually followed by large numbers of Afghan police, military and fire officials. Shortly thereafter four Soviets arrived, two of whom were identified as officials of the Soviet Embassy.

Because of their activities with the Afghan police on the scene, three of the Soviets were presumed to be police advisors.

During the course of the next several hours, U.S. Embassy officers repeatedly urged restraint on the part of the local authorities and the Soviet advisors dealing with the situation. Repeated attempts by Embassy officials to establish contact with the highest levels of the Afghan Government were met

with negative results. Efforts on the part of U.S. officials to gain information as to the terrorists' demands, the DRA's plan of action, and other relevant circumstances pertaining to the Ambassador's abduction were, for the most part, ignored. In spite of oft-repeated U.S. Government requests that no precipitous action be taken that might endanger the life of Ambassador Dubs, Afghan authorities prepared for and executed an assault on the room in which the Ambassador was being held. Upon entering the hotel room following the assault, American Embassy officers discovered the wounded and perhaps dead body of Ambassador Adolph Dubs. A few minutes later, Ambassador Dubs was pronounced dead by the Embassy medical officer.

In the immediate aftermath of Ambassador Dubs' death, the U.S. Department of State initiated an investigation into the circumstances of the incident.

It should be noted that this investigation was severely hampered by the unwillingness of Afghan police and security officials to provide even basic investigative data. Only marginal assistance was provided during the entire investigation. Lines of communication were reduced by the Afghans to the point that the Embassy had no recourse but to submit formal diplomatic notes in attempts to obtain information vital to the investigation.

The following is a summation of the significant findings of the Department's investigation:

Background

The U.S. Department of State had no indication of a possible threat or kidnapping plot directed against Ambassador Dubs prior to the incident. The Ambassador did not normally have personal body guard protection while traveling in his vehicle. The Soviet Ambassador was the only member of the Diplomatic Corps to consider bodyguard protection necessary. The official vehicle in which the Ambassador was riding was partially armored and afforded a degree of protection from weapons fire. The Ambassador's chauffeur had been instructed on defensive driving techniques, and as instructed, routinely varied his driving routes when transporting the Ambassador.

Following the Ambassador's death, information was obtained which, if valid, sheds some light on why the kidnapping of the Ambassador was successful. On an evening approximately three months prior to the incident, the Ambassador had

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allegedly permitted two searches of his vehicle when stopped by Afghan authorities. As an accredited Ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, Ambassador Dubs enjoyed complete diplomatic immunity, and as such, detention and searches of his person or vehicle were not permissible. The reported decision by the Ambassador to open the vehicle's door to the inspecting policeman permitted the kidnappers to proceed with their plans unrestricted. Had he declined to unlock the door, the abduction might have been avoided.

At a February 19, 1979 press conference, Afghanistan's then Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister, Hafizullah AMIN, stated that according to Ambassador Dubs' chauffeur, the Ambassador's residential guards "had told the Ambassador that his vehicle was being shadowed." The Minister stated that Afghan security authorities had suggested to the U.S. Embassy, prior to the incident, that police cars escort the Ambassador's vehicle.

While it is conceivable that the Ambassador's vehicle may have been followed on various occasions, neither the chauffeur nor security guards employed with the U.S. Embassy have provided any indication that they were aware of such activity. On no occasion during Ambassador Dubs' assignment to Kabul had the DIA formally offered to provide the Ambassador with a daily police escort.

Locations

The site at which Ambassador Dubs' vehicle was stopped by his abductors is in a moderately travelled area located near the USICA American Center and adjacent to a number of commercial establishments. The site is close to several Afghan Government installations and is within sight of three locations where Afghan police are normally assigned sentry duty. At the time of the abduction, at least one police officer was standing directly across the street on duty in front of the nearby USICA building. Given the above circumstances, and the fact that the chauffeur varied his routes daily while transporting the Ambassador, an abduction of this nature would appear to have entailed considerable risk. Nevertheless, the Ambassador's vehicle was stopped and four men, at least two of whom were armed, entered the vehicle, and forced the chauffeur to drive to the Kabul Hotel. The abduction occurred with relative ease, and without any apparent interference from host country authorities.

The kidnappers chose to hold the Ambassador in a room located on the second floor of the Kabul Hotel. The hotel is government owned and on the day of the incident, security had been increased due to the residence of an official Iraqi delegation. The room utilized by the kidnappers had a large window fronting the street and provided a poor defense. The choice of the hotel and particularly a room which left the kidnappers open to sniper fire from balconies directly across the street belies what was up to that point an apparently well-executed kidnapping.

Actions Taken by U.S. Government and the DPA During Events Leading to Ambassador Dubs' Death

Ambassador Dubs was held hostage in Room 117 of the Kabul Hotel from approximately 0850 to 1250 hours on February 14, 1979. The American Embassy was alerted to the abduction at approximately 0900 hours and immediately requested assistance from appropriate DPA authorities. Pursuant to the official policy of the U.S. Department of State, which holds host country governments responsible for the protection of United States diplomatic personnel, the DPA assumed control of the rescue operations. Numerous U.S. Embassy officials were dispatched to the scene both to provide assistance to the Afghan authorities, and to insure that the action taken was in the best interest of securing the safe release of the Ambassador. The Embassy also alerted the Department of State of the kidnapping -- where a working group was immediately established. During the events that followed, Americans at the hotel and elsewhere in Kabul were excluded from the decision making processes, and their efforts to gain information as to the terrorists' demands, the DPA's plan of action and other relevant circumstances were for the most part unsuccessful. As revealed later in this document, much of the minimal information which was provided by the Security Forces has been found to be inaccurate.

American officials present at the Embassy, at the hotel, and at the Interior Ministry repeatedly urged that no action be taken which could endanger the life of Ambassador Dubs, and stressed the need for patient negotiation with the terrorists. These actions were endorsed by the Department of State, where efforts were initiated for the dispatch of an anti-terrorist expert as well as an aircraft in the event a medical evacuation was needed. The U.S. Government's position was clearly understood by Afghan authorities and by Soviet officials in authority at the hotel. Nevertheless, as noon approached, it became clearly evident to the Americans that the security forces intended to assault the hotel room where the Ambassador was being held. Repeated

efforts by the Americans to dissuade the authorities from taking this course of action were unsuccessful and revealed that the operation was under the control of senior DRA officials not present at the hotel.

At the U.S. Embassy, American officials continually attempted to establish contact with senior DRA officials at the Foreign Ministry, the Prime Ministry and the Interior Ministry. The attempted contacts, both by telephone and personal visits to the officials' offices, failed to dissuade the DRA from deciding to storm the room. As a result, the Embassy was unable to determine the terrorists' demands, the DRA's plan of action and other relevant information. At one point during the latter events of the morning, the Afghan official believed in charge of the operation, Commandant of Police, Sayed Saoud TAROON, informed the senior U.S. Embassy official that the DRA had no intention of breaking into the room by force and thereby possibly jeopardizing the safety of the Ambassador. Similar assurances were given the same Embassy official by Deputy Foreign Minister Shah Mohamed DOSY.

At 1250 hours security forces of the DRA, without prior consultation with or approval of U.S. Embassy officials regarding their intended plan of action, initiated an assault of Room 117. American officers present at the scene initially heard a loud thud as the door to the room was forced open followed by immediate heavy gunfire from both inside and outside of the hotel. The concentrated fire lasted approximately 40 seconds and stopped. The fire from snipers positioned across the street continued for several seconds until authorities at the hotel motioned them to stop. Moments after the firing ceased, American officials including a physician and stretcher bearers started toward the room, at which time a few more shots were heard from within. The Americans stopped momentarily and were then waved on by members of the Afghan security forces into Room 117. Inside, the Americans found the unconscious and perhaps dead body of Ambassador Dubs. Immediately following the incident, an American officer was informed by a police official that the attack had been launched immediately after a gunshot was first heard from within the room. No Americans present at the scene remembered hearing any gunfire until after the assault was initiated by the Afghan authorities.

Shortly following the Ambassador's death, the U.S. Embassy submitted a diplomatic note to the DRA requesting an official report on the kidnapping and death of Ambassador Dubs. Included in the note was a specific request for an explanation of the circumstances leading to the decision to assault the room in which the Ambassador was held.

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The DRA's report of the Ambassador's death was provided to the U.S. Embassy on February 27, 1979. This account states that the Afghan authorities attempted to play a waiting game with the terrorists. The terrorists had allegedly demanded the release from prison of an individual who was not in the DRA's custody and could not be located. The terrorists reportedly had set numerous deadlines for their demand to be met, and the DRA had been able to negotiate some time extensions. The DRA claimed that the oft-postponed ultimatum finally expired, and it was therefore necessary to make an immediate attempt to save the Ambassador from what otherwise would have been certain death by the persons who held him captive. According to the report, at 1225 hours, security forces were informed by the terrorists that if the demands were not met within 10 minutes they would kill the Ambassador. After another unsuccessful attempt to extend the time limit, the report concludes, the security forces took action in order to save the Ambassador's life. They claim that coincident with this decision to act, the sound of gunfire was heard within the room.

Yet the same DRA report as well as eyewitness testimony of numerous U.S. Embassy officials reveals that the security forces intended forced action well before the alleged final ultimatum by the terrorists. The DRA's account states that between 0930 and 1000 hours, the American Embassy was "contacted" and requested to send a representative to act as an interpreter and convey the government's assault intentions to the Ambassador. The report states the Embassy's representative arrived immediately and was told to tell the Ambassador in German to get out of the bedroom area on the excuse of going to the bathroom, and, if this was not possible, to lie down on the floor pretending to faint. According to the government's report, after initial verbal contact was established, the terrorists refused to allow further conversation. The fact that the official report claims that as early as 0930 - 1000 hours, the government sought to warn Ambassador Dubs of an imminent assault points to a government decision soon after the kidnapping to storm the room.

At variance with the official report is the testimony of American officers at the hotel. The Embassy officer requested to speak with the Ambassador had been present at the hotel since 0900 hours. The security forces did not ask the officer to speak with the Ambassador until much later, at approximately 1140 hours, and the conversation did not actually occur until 1150 hours. The Embassy officer, rather than deliver the alert immediately to the Ambassador, asked for a conference with the police since

the message obviously meant the authorities were poised to strike. From the instructions given to the Embassy officer to pass to the Ambassador it was evident that the security forces intended to storm the room at about 1140 hours. When the Embassy officer refused to relay the instruction to the Ambassador, an Afghan police official became very upset and insisted he was under orders to storm the room immediately.

Similarly the DOW report states that at about 1030 hours "security personnel" were assigned to climb up to the window of Room 117 and, if possible, to kill the terrorists. This again points to an early decision to storm the room. In fact, it was at approximately 1120 hours that Americans observed the Afghan police moving ladders against the outside of the hotel in such a way that the terrorists could not fail to see the action. Also at this time, Americans observed Afghan military troops rushing into the hotel towards Room 117, cocking their weapons as they ran.

Additional testimony from American eyewitnesses reveal that, at approximately 1200 hours, police requested that American medical personnel and stretcher bearers be placed in readiness. At 1210 hours American personnel were told that a decision had been made to assault the room under orders from the "Prime Minister". At approximately 1245 hours, it became clear that security officials had received final orders to assault the room. One specially armored policeman lay prone on the floor pointing his weapon at the door, while others stood behind and beside him. Snipers were observed being positioned on balconies located directly across the street from the room. Shortly before 1250 hours, the Afghan authorities instructed all non-participants to take positions of safety, and at 1250 hours, Afghan authorities initiated the assault on the room.

I Role of Soviet Officials During Events Preceding the Ambassador's Death

U.S. Embassy officers observed four Soviets acting in the capacity of advisors to the Afghan security forces during the events at the Kabul Hotel. The Soviets were observed in repeated discussions with Afghan authorities at the hotel and appeared to be frequently consulted. American officials for the most part were excluded from these discussions.

In addition to the four Soviets at the hotel, an officer observed an individual he was certain to be official exiting the office of the Afghan official to be in charge of the operation, Police Commandant. This observation occurred shortly after the assault on the Afghan authorities in the hotel room. It has been determined that the Soviet was probably in the company of the Afghan authorities at least one hour and forty minutes prior to the assault.

Two of the Soviets present at the Hotel Kabul had been observed by American officers arriving with cameras. The contents of which could not clearly be established. One of the Soviets present at the hotel was known to Embassy officers as a security official of the Soviet Embassy in Kabul. Another was subsequently identified from photographs as being also on the Soviet diplomatic list. The identities of the other Soviets present at the hotel and at the Police Commandant's office have not been determined.

During the events at the Kabul Hotel, U.S. Embassy officials made it clear to the Soviets present that the U.S. Government desired that no precipitous action be taken which might endanger the life of Ambassador Dubs. Requests for negotiation with the terrorists were repeatedly made by Americans. These requests as to a course of action were clearly understood by the Soviet officials and they agreed with.

None of the Soviets were observed participating in the actual assault on the hotel room. The Soviets were, however, observed taking an operational role just before and during the assault. One Soviet was observed with an Afghan security official with the loading of a rifle. Another Soviet was observed providing an Afghan with what appeared to be a small projectile, and two Soviets were observed positioning snipers on the roof across the street from the hotel room. The latter were also observed later motioning the snipers to fire following 40 seconds of intensive gunfire on the hotel room.

The DPA has specifically denied any participation by any part of Soviet advisers during the events leading to Ambassador's death.

In response to inquiries by the U.S. Government, the Soviet Union has officially stated that it had no influence on the decisions of Afghan authorities at saving

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American Ambassador. The Soviet Union acknowledged the presence of Soviet representatives at the hotel but alleged that their presence there was to protect the lives of Soviet citizens residing at the hotel.

Terrorists Demands - Motive for the Abduction

During the period in which Ambassador Dubs was held hostage, Afghan authorities never directly informed U.S. Embassy officials of demands imposed by the kidnappers. / At approximately 1130 hours, American officers at the hotel were informed, however, by a Soviet official that the kidnappers were demanding the return of one of their comrades captured earlier at the hotel by security authorities. The kidnappers reportedly made this demand as a preliminary condition to any further discussions. Shortly after 1200 hours, the same Soviet official informed American officers that the Afghan authorities were working under time constraints imposed by the kidnappers; the original noon deadline had expired; and that the police believed they had an extension until 1300 hours. Information acquired by the U.S. Embassy shortly after the Ambassador's abduction revealed the kidnappers had demanded the release of three prisoners named "WAHEI, MAJID, and FAIZANI." The information suggests that the demands when presented to the DRA Government were rejected.

Approximately two hours after the Ambassador's death, Afghanistan's Foreign Minister/Deputy Prime Minister, stated at the airport to members of the diplomatic corps that the Ambassador's abductors had demanded the release of three prisoners. The Minister did not name these individuals, but stated that they could not be located. Later in the same day, however, Afghan radio and press accounts contradicted the Foreign Minister's account by stating that the terrorists had demanded the release of one individual, named "Bahrudin BAHES", who the authorities could not locate. This alleged demand for the release of "BAHES" was reiterated in statements made to Western journalists by the Commandant of Police. Two days later, on February 16, 1979, the Afghan Foreign Minister in contradiction of his earlier airport statement, publicly stated that the terrorists had only demanded the release from prison of just one person, Bahrudin BAHES.

The DRA's official report on the death of Ambassador Dubs provided to the U.S. Embassy on February 27, 1979 also states that the terrorists demanded the release of just one person, Bahrudin BAHES. The report claims that BAHES

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was not in the government's custody and could not be located. The report further states that the terrorists had established deadlines for BAPIS' release at 0930, 1630, 1100 and finally 1230 hours. The report makes no mention of demands for the release of any other individuals.

Several months after the Ambassador's death, U.S. Embassy representatives obtained further information from an official of the DRA Government to the effect that the Ambassador's kidnappers had demanded the release of three prisoners. The full extent of the demands actually made of the DRA Government by the terrorists has yet to be answered.

Number of Terrorists and Circumstances Surrounding Deaths

Evidence available to the Department of State reveals the Ambassador was abducted by four individuals of probable Afghan nationality. Further evidence reveals that only three terrorists were observed as being killed or captured by the Afghan authorities at the Kabul Hotel.

The DRA's account of the death of Ambassador Dubs states that following the assault, Afghan security forces found the body of the Ambassador, the bodies of three terrorists, and a fourth terrorist, who was still firing his weapon in Room 117. The fourth terrorist was allegedly wounded and captured by the Afghan authorities. According to the DRA report, "he was taken to the hospital and the doctors tried to treat him in order that the true facts might be determined." The report states that "this earnest effort was fruitless and, thus, the last person of this criminal terrorist band died."

Eyewitness testimony of American officials present at the Hotel differs, however. American officers who entered Room 117 moments after the shooting observed only two terrorists, both of whom appeared dead. An American officer, who remained outside the door to Room 117 immediately following the assault observed only two bodies other than the Ambassador's removed by security forces. The testimony of numerous U.S. Embassy officials present at the hotel reveals that one other apparent member of the terrorist group was removed alive and relatively unharmed from the hotel. This person had been captured on the first floor of the hotel as early as 0500 hours and had been held in continuous custody of the Afghan authorities. The man had been observed being escorted to the second floor to speak through the door of Room 117 to his comrades but was never permitted entry into the room. During the assault, the

subject was held in an area away from the scene of the shooting. Immediately following the assault, American officers present in the lobby of the hotel observed the bodies of only two slain terrorists, plus one living terrorist leaving the hotel.

Early in the evening on the same day as the Ambassador's death, U.S. Embassy officers were permitted to view the bodies of four individuals purported by the DRA to be the abductors and killers of Ambassador Dubs. U.S. Embassy representatives who witnessed the abduction and events at the Hotel identified three of the bodies. Two of the bodies were the subjects observed to have been slain inside Room 117. The third was that of the subject captured by the DRA authorities at the hotel and who had been last seen alive when removed from the hotel. The fourth individual could not be identified, and the U.S. Government cannot confirm the DRA's claim of this individual's culpability.

An investigation conducted by the U.S. Government has not determined the existence of additional accomplices or conspirators. The DRA has provided no evidence that any effort on their part has been made to locate or identify others who may have been involved.

Identity and Affiliation of the Terrorists

The report of the death of Ambassador Dubs provided by the DRA does not identify the terrorists. Officials of the DRA Government have simply stated that inasmuch as all the terrorists were killed, their identities could not be determined. The DRA's account implies that the terrorists were affiliated with the individual whose release was demanded from prison, Bahruddin BAHES. They have described BAHES as a terrorist, bandit, extreme leftist and adventurist. No political or religious affiliations were ascribed to BAHES.

The investigation conducted by the Department of State has not been able to determine the identities of the Ambassador's abductors. The investigation has also failed to obtain any evidence to support the contention that the terrorists had in fact demanded BAHES' release from prison. As previously noted, the U.S. Government has obtained testimony which reveals the terrorists' demands were for the release of three individuals named WAHEZ, MAJID, and FAIZANI. It is noted, however, that the

name "HANEZ" is similar to "HANEY" and could possibly be the same individual. Information available to the U.S. Government on these four names revealed a number of different persons of various political or religious prominence who possessed the same names or very similar names. As a result, the specific individuals sought by the terrorists cannot be determined. Available information suggests that the release from prison of several of these persons, especially those identified as religious leaders, would probably have been politically awkward for the DRA.

To date, no terrorist organization or dissident group has come forward to claim responsibility for the kidnapping and killing of Ambassador Dubs. This in itself is unusual since most terrorist organizations are eager to gain publicity about themselves.

Weapons Allegedly Possessed by the Terrorists -
Cause of Ambassador Dubs' Death As Determined by Autopsy

Witness testimony obtained by the U.S. Government reveals that when the Ambassador was kidnapped in his car, the terrorists possessed at least two handguns. U.S. Embassy officers at the Kabul Hotel were unable to observe any weapons which may have been in the terrorists' possession, although an Embassy officer saw a brass-colored handgun being removed from the room.

The DRA's official account of Ambassador Dubs' death reports the following arms found in the possession of the terrorists inside Room 117.

- a. A Machine gun (CMH) without any marks.
- b. A hand grenade (#36M).
- c. A pistol (mousekiller) 777272 Star, with 10 projectiles.
- d. A pistol (caliber 7.65mm) with six projectiles.

Autopsy and forensic examinations performed by agencies of the U.S. Government point to a discrepancy. The Ambassador died as a result of at least 10 wounds inflicted by small caliber weapons. Two of the chest wounds were the result of bullets fired from the same .25 caliber weapon. One wound to the right side of the head, three wounds to the left side of the head and one wound to the left hand were the result of bullets fired from a .22 caliber weapon. At

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least some, if not all, of the .22 caliber wounds were fired by the same weapon, and associated powder burns reveal the weapon was fired from point blank to three inches in range. The Ambassador also sustained one gunshot wound to the right forearm and two gunshot wounds to the right wrist caused by small caliber weapons, possibly either a .22 or a .25 caliber. The U.S. Government has determined that no bullets recovered from the Ambassador's body were capable of being fired from the weapon identified by the DRA as a "Pistol (Caliber 7.65mm)." Furthermore, the weapon identified as a handgrenade (#36M) inflicted no wounds to the Ambassador. The U.S. Government has determined that the weapon identified by the DRA as a "pistol (mousekiller) 77272 Star" fires .25 caliber bullets. Rifling impressions which this weapon produces are consistent with those found on the .25 caliber bullets removed from the Ambassador. The U.S. Government has been unable to identify as a .22 caliber weapon or the caliber of the remaining weapon identified by the DRA as a "machinegun (CMN) without marks."

The DRA's report implies that all wounds sustained by the Ambassador were caused by weapons fired by the terrorists. Their account states that prior to assaulting Room 117 the sound of gunfire was heard from within the room. American officers standing approximately thirty feet away reported hearing gunshots only after the door to Room 117 was forced open by Afghan security forces. Noteworthy is the fact that none of the assaulting forces appeared to have received any injuries, and Americans observed no evidence of rounds impacting in the hallway outside of Room 117. Evidence of numerous apparent bullet penetrations were, however, observed inside the room on the wall directly behind the area where the Ambassador was found slain. Testimony from American officials reveal that upon the termination of the initial 40 seconds of intense gunfire, security forces entered the room and several more gunshots were heard.

Approximately seven hours after the Ambassador's death, U.S. Embassy officers were invited by the Afghan Government to view the bodies of four males purported to be the terrorists as well as the weapons found inside Room 117. Following the viewing of the bodies, Embassy officials asked to examine the weapons and the clothing of the dead men but were informed that a request would have to be submitted to the "Prime Ministry".

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U.S. Embassy Requests Made to the Afghan Government Following the Ambassador's Death

Subsequent to the receipt of the instruction that the Embassy should address any formal inquiries through the "Prime Ministry" the U.S. Government officially requested through the Foreign Ministry that the DRA undertake a serious and thorough effort to fully clarify the circumstances of the Ambassador's death. A U.S. Embassy diplomatic note submitted to the DRA on February 18, requested a copy of a formal police report on the incident, firm identification of the terrorists, an explanation of the circumstances leading to the decision to storm the hotel room, a complete ballistics report on the weapons found in the room, an autopsy report and forensic information on the slain terrorists.

A day later, on February 19, 1979, U.S. Embassy officials also verbally requested permission from the Afghan Commandant of Police to examine the weapons. The Commandant advised the officials that a diplomatic request to the Foreign Ministry would be required.

On February 26, 1979 the U.S. Embassy submitted a second diplomatic note requesting permission for American officials to view and photograph the weapons possessed by the abductors of Ambassador Dubs.

On February 27, 1979 the DRA furnished their official report. In addition to the discrepancies regarding the Afghans' actions at the hotel, and the terrorists' demands, identity, affiliation, number, weapons and circumstances of death, the report provided no ballistics information, no autopsy reports, no forensic information nor any identification of the terrorists. The report minimized the role of the U.S. Embassy and its employees at the hotel, and makes no mention of the Soviets involved in the incident. The report did not identify who wrote it but it appeared to have been written by the Police Commandant. It was transmitted to the Embassy by the Foreign Ministry.

On February 28, 1979, the U.S. Embassy submitted a third diplomatic note reiterating the requests for the identification of the terrorists, the complete ballistics reports of their weapons, and autopsy reports with forensic information. The request also asked the name and position of the official who prepared the official DRA report. The DRA's response was simply that all information which security authorities could obtain had been included in their official report forwarded by the Commandant of the Kabul Police.

On February 26, 1979, the U.S. Embassy officially requested permission for U.S. officials to view and photograph the interior and exterior of the Kabul Hotel, including the room where the Ambassador was held. The DRA granted this request on March 6. On this date Embassy officials discovered almost all traces of the incident occurring in the hotel room had been removed, and repairs had been made to the bullet-chipped exterior of the building.

On March 6, 1979, the DRA informed the U.S. Embassy via diplomatic note that "the information on the types and shapes of the arms left from the terrorists together with whatever information that concerned security authorities could obtain" was provided in their report of February 27, 1979.

On April 18, 1979, the U.S. Embassy submitted a fourth diplomatic note requesting, again, complete ballistics evidence as well as permission to photograph all four weapons. The DRA Deputy Foreign Minister, to whom the note was presented, informed U.S. officials that on the night of the tragedy the U.S. Embassy had been given the opportunity to examine and photograph the weapons. The Deputy Foreign Minister advised that it was the fault of the U.S. Embassy for failing to take advantage of this opportunity when it had been presented.

On April 24, 1979, the Afghan Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister informed U.S. Embassy officials that he had given specific orders on February 14 that the Americans were to be permitted to view and photograph the weapons. When informed that U.S. Embassy officers had attempted on that day to do so but were refused by DRA officials, the Deputy Prime Minister provided no explanation. However, he commented that with the elapse of time, it might now be difficult to recover the exact weapons since they had probably been thrown into a collection of hundreds of weapons seized from terrorists over recent months.

On May 20, 1979, U.S. Embassy officials raised the question of the DRA's lack of response to the Embassy's repeated requests to examine the weapons for ballistics evidence with the Afghan's Second Deputy Foreign Minister. The Minister was informed that this request had been conveyed in several diplomatic notes, none of which produced results. The Minister replied that the Deputy Foreign Minister was already on record as having offered the U.S. Embassy an opportunity to view the weapons on the evening

of February 14. When informed that U.S. Embassy officers were denied access to the weapons on this date, the Minister stated that since his government was on record as providing the opportunity, it was the fault of the U.S. Government for not taking advantage of it. The Afghan Government, the Minister stated, regarded the matter as closed.

On June 9, 1979 the U.S. Embassy submitted another diplomatic note summarizing the results of the aforementioned autopsy and forensic examinations and specifically asked the DRA to clarify the following questions:

- a. Was a .22-caliber weapon found at the scene?
- b. If such a weapon was found, when may we examine it?
- c. Can the Afghan Government account for the fatal wounds which our investigation shows were fired from a .22-caliber weapon?

As of the date of this report, the DRA has not responded to the June 9, 1979 diplomatic note, has not allowed U.S. officials to examine the weapons, and has not provided any further identification or ballistics evidence concerning the weapons.

U.S. Embassy officials have held repeated discussions with DRA authorities in an effort to clarify the circumstances of the Ambassador's death and the serious inaccuracies and discrepancies in the DRA reports. The results of these discussions have been entirely unproductive.

Conclusion

The Afghan Government to date has refused to cooperate with U.S. Government efforts to clarify the circumstances of Ambassador Dubs' death. The account of the Ambassador's death as provided by the DRA is incomplete, misleading, and inaccurate. Some of the actions taken by DRA authorities during the events preceding the Ambassador's death may be attributed to Afghan inexperience in handling kidnapping incidents. However, sufficient evidence has been obtained to establish serious misrepresentation or suppression of the truth by the government. Consequently, the following significant questions surrounding the circumstances of Ambassador Dubs' death remain unanswered:

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1. Why was the Ambassador the target of the kidnapping?
2. Who were his abductors? Who do they represent? What were their demands?
3. Why did the DRA assault the room where the Ambassador was held?
4. Who fired the weapons which resulted in the Ambassador's death, especially the unidentified .22 caliber weapon? Why has the DRA refused to allow U.S. Government officials to examine the weapons?
5. Why was at least one of the terrorists killed by DRA authorities while in captivity? What information if any did he provide before his death?
6. What were the circumstances regarding the death of the fourth terrorist? Was this individual actually one of the Ambassador's abductors?
7. What was the involvement of the Soviets in the decision making process in the operation directed against the terrorists?
8. Why was the DRA not more cooperative with U.S. Embassy officials during the hours immediately preceding the Ambassador's death and with the subsequent investigation?
9. Why has the DRA provided incomplete, misleading and inaccurate information to the U.S. Government?

To date, there has been no indication that the DRA has any intention of providing the necessary cooperation and assistance required to resolve these questions.

In addition: Three of the principal Afghan officials involved in the Afghan Government's actions on February 14 have been subsequently killed. Sayed Daoud TARBOON, who was the Commandant of Police and directed the action of the police from his office in the Interior Ministry, was killed in an intraparty power struggle at the People's Palace in Kabul on September 14, 1979. Lal MOHAMMAD, who was the Kabul Police Chief in charge of police at the hotel and who led the forced entry into Room 117, was killed in the countryside outside Kabul by insurgents about the same time. Hafizullah AMIN, who was the Foreign Minister/Deputy Prime Minister and later the President, was killed in Kabul on December 27, 1979 during a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

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